December 10, 1979 Commitment-for-Treatment Order

The December 10, 1979 Commitment-for-Treatment Order converted a diagnosis of multiple personality into a court-directed treatment disposition for Billy Milligan. It found that his mental illness substantially impaired his judgment and contact with reality, identified risks to himself and others, and ordered hospitalization at Lima State Hospital in a maximum-security setting. At the same time, it specified that his treatment should be consistent with the diagnosis—a consequential qualification in a case where clinical judgments, criminal responsibility, and the degree of confinement were repeatedly contested.

Legal and Clinical Background

The order followed an earlier dispute over whether Milligan could assist in his own criminal defense. In January 1978, while he was in Franklin County Jail, Gary Schweickart and Judy Stevenson arranged for a psychological evaluation using funds released by the Public Defender’s Office. Dr. Willis C. Driscoll tested Milligan on January 8 and 13. His intelligence testing produced an IQ score of 68, which he attributed in part to depression, and he diagnosed acute schizophrenia. His report described a severe disturbance of identity, difficulty distinguishing self from surroundings, and voices that Milligan understood as contending forces. Driscoll concluded that Milligan could not adequately understand events or counsel in his own defense and recommended hospitalization for further examination and possible treatment.

On January 19, Stevenson and Schweickart presented the report to Judge Jay C. Flowers as evidence that Milligan could not assist with his defense. Flowers directed Southwest Community Mental Health Center to assign its forensic psychiatry unit to examine him. The defense feared that information gathered by the court-appointed evaluators might be used by the prosecution; the parties eventually agreed that prosecutors could question Milligan about incriminating statements made in those interviews only if he took the stand. This earlier proceeding concerned his capacity at that time to participate in his defense. It was distinct from the later question addressed by the December 1979 order: whether his mental condition and demonstrated risks required court-ordered hospitalization.

A separate legal ruling had already addressed Milligan’s responsibility for the charged offenses. At trial, Judge Flowers dismissed the first rape count for lack of corroborating evidence and a similar method of operation. On counts two through ten, the stipulated medical evidence established that Milligan had been mentally ill at the time of the offenses, could not distinguish right from wrong, and could not refrain from the acts. The court found him not guilty by reason of insanity. That verdict did not itself settle where or under what conditions he should receive treatment; the later commitment order made a new determination about illness, danger, and hospitalization.

Findings and Disposition

The order’s findings defined mental illness in terms of its effects: a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, and memory that grossly impaired judgment, behavior, and the ability to recognize reality. It identified Milligan’s condition as multiple personality. The court thus recorded a specific diagnosis rather than relying only on a general finding of mental illness.

The order then set out the grounds for hospitalization. It found a substantial risk of physical harm to Milligan himself, citing evidence of threats of suicide; a substantial risk of harm to others, citing evidence of recent violent behavior; and a need for hospital treatment, based on conduct creating a grave and imminent risk to the substantial rights of others and to Milligan. On this basis, the court found him dangerous to himself and others and in need of a maximum-security facility. These were legal findings about risk and placement, not merely a restatement of the clinical diagnosis.

The disposition committed Milligan to Lima State Hospital for treatment consistent with the multiple-personality diagnosis. That final instruction connected confinement to a treatment rationale: the order required hospitalization in a highly secure institution but also specified that care should take account of the condition the court had identified. The findings and disposition therefore joined two ideas that remained in tension throughout Milligan’s institutional history—protection from assessed danger and treatment directed toward his particular diagnosis.

Transfer to Lima and Institutional Consequences

The order came after an abrupt transfer from Athens. On October 4, 1979, Milligan was handcuffed and belt-shackled and driven 180 miles to Lima State Hospital for the Criminally Insane. He had no time to say goodbye to anyone except Dr. David Caul. The December order formalized his commitment to Lima and set out the legal reasoning for keeping him there: the court cited suicide threats, recent violent behavior, impaired recognition of reality, and the need for treatment in a maximum-security hospital.

The order’s consequences extended beyond the immediate placement. State mental-health officials later decided to move Milligan to the newly opened Dayton Forensic Center, and he was transferred there on November 19, 1980. At Dayton he was not allowed to paint. He spent time reading, writing, and sketching, and hoped a 180-day hearing would result in a return to Athens, where he believed Dr. Caul could treat him and resume work on fusion. During visits, the account records that Milligan sometimes said he did not know who he was; partial fusion left him without a name, Ragen had reportedly lost the ability to speak English, and communication among the personalities had diminished. These later circumstances do not alter the order’s terms, but they show how its maximum-security disposition formed part of a continuing institutional struggle over safety, treatment, and the conditions under which Milligan’s identities could be addressed.

Significance

The order marks a distinct legal stage after the insanity acquittal. The acquittal concerned Milligan’s mental state and capacities at the time of the offenses; the December 1979 findings addressed his present condition, risks, and need for hospitalization. Likewise, Dr. Driscoll’s earlier evaluation concerned whether Milligan could assist in his defense, while the later order determined that he required commitment and specified a treatment setting. The sequence makes clear that diagnosis, competency, criminal responsibility, and post-verdict placement were related questions but not interchangeable legal conclusions.

Its wording also held two institutional imperatives together without resolving their friction. Milligan was judged dangerous enough to require maximum security, yet the commitment expressly required treatment consistent with multiple personality. The result was neither a simple declaration that diagnosis ended confinement nor a placement order indifferent to treatment. It was a formal mandate to treat a diagnosed condition within the very secure setting the court considered necessary, a combination whose practical effects continued to shape Milligan’s life in Lima and Dayton.